
Feminist
Boston Bar President Gives False Information About Marriage Act

Do
All Boston Lawyers Oppose 'Protection of Marriage Act?'
July
2001
Another
example of the power that feminists have in Massachusetts to
push their agenda was shown by the President of the Boston Bar,
Joan Lukey, when that feminist testified before the legislature
in May.
This
story was emailed to Atty. Lukey and she responded but declined
to comment.
Boston
Bar President Joan Lukey was wrong when she testified that the
Protection of Marriage Act would be "superfluous" and
when she commented to reporter Ed Oliver afterwards that the
proposed statute is "redundant" and unnecessary, says
Prof. Dwight Duncan of Southern New England School of Law.
He
wonders how the Boston Bar could not know that a lawsuit was
filed in April in an attempt to change the definition of
marriage in Massachusetts which has existed since before the
founding of the country. Up until lately, he points out, we have
all just assumed, as did the founders, that the definition is
"one man and one woman."
Prof.
Duncan says, "We urgently need a written statute to make it
clear to the courts that the people of Massachusetts still
consider that to be the definition of marriage."
Statute
Not 'Superfluous'
In
her testimony, Lukey had told the Judiciary Committee that if
the marriage bill were passed, it would be
"superfluous." Ed Oliver asked her to explain her
statement:
"The
law of Massachusetts already prohibits same-sex marriage and
therefore it seems to the Boston Bar Association that enacting a
statute which again prohibits same-sex marriage has a
stigmatizing and unnecessarily discriminatory effect on gays and
lesbians. They are trying to strike down existing law which
prohibits same-sex marriage. It doesn't make any sense to us
that the legislature would pass another law, which would seem to
have the purpose of discriminating against people and
stigmatizing them when the rule which the statute addresses is
already in place."
But
Prof. Duncan replied that the proposed statute does not
discriminate against gays. "It is about fostering families
in which children can have both a mother and a father. It
applies to heterosexual men who wish to have two or more wives
as well as heterosexual men who wish to live with a woman
without assuming the responsibilities of marriage. It is not
aimed at homosexuals."
Ed
Oliver asked Lukey which statute prohibits same-sex marriage:
"It's
a case decision of the [Mass.] Supreme Judicial Court. We have
two forms of law: statutory law and what's called common law,
which is judge-decreed law. They have equal force and effect.
The Supreme Judicial Court decreed at the beginning of this
century and has repeatedly restated that marriage must be
between a man and a woman, most recently in 1993, so it's not
that long ago. So, since they've already said that is the law,
it's cruel to pass a statute saying the same thing."
But
Prof. Duncan points out that what one court says can quickly be
changed by another court, as has happened in Vermont.
Duncan
stated in his testimony prior to Lukey's testimony, "[I]n
Massachusetts you have to go back to an 1810 case, Inhabitants
of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester, for a clear statement of
the obvious: '[Marriage] is an engagement, by which a single man
and a single woman, of sufficient discretion, take each other
for husband and wife.'" Duncan says even that definition
was extraneous and superfluous to the case the court was
deciding in 1810. (Lawyers use the word "dicta" to
describe such unnecessary language.) Prof. Duncan says that a
case in 1933, The Adoption of Tammy case, did note in passing
(also in dicta) that "the laws of the Commonwealth do not
permit [a lesbian couple] to enter into a legally cognizable
marriage."
But
these old precedents about marriage in Massachusetts can easily
be "swatted away by the courts as if they were a bothersome
horsefly," says Prof. Duncan.
Lukey
Says It's 'Cruel'
Ed
Oliver asked the bar president if she is saying the bill is
redundant.
"It
is redundant and we also think it is cruel," answered Lukey.
Then
why is there such fierce opposition to the bill if it is
redundant? asked Oliver.
Lukey
responded, "That's only one section of the bill, the first
section, Section A. It is the one which purports to give the
definition of marriage. That's the redundant section."
The
President of the Bar went on to say that the second section
would impact private employers. "The next section of the
marriage bill goes on to say any relationship which isn't a
legal marriage can't enjoy any of the benefits of marriage. That
would appear to suggest, as my testimony just said, that if an
employer decided for example that it wanted to grant benefits to
the same-sex partner of an employee, it could no longer do that.
That's discriminatory in a state that's one of the first in the
country to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation."
But
that is not true, says Prof. Duncan. In the first place,
relationships other than marriage are only prohibited from
receiving benefits that are "exclusive" to marriage.
The proposed statute does not cut off all benefits to housemates
or dependents. Under it, any company could continue to give
benefits to anyone it wished. The bill would have no effect upon
that.
In
addition, those benefits that the legislature unbundles from
marriage and applies more generally, as has happened with
adoption (since single people can adopt), would not be
restricted to marriage.
Oliver
asked Pres. Lukey if it were possible the legislature might try
to change the wording of the bill by taking one section out and
passing the other? She replied:
"Well,
Chairman Donnelly certainly made it sound as if they might pass
section 4A and not the rest of the statute. If they passed 4A,
they would be basically enacting the section of the statute
which is already the law of the Commonwealth. But it did sound
from what he said as if they might consider doing that. I do
think from the questioning that they were disturbed by Section
4B which is primarily what the Boston Bar Association comments
were directed toward, since we take no position on same-sex
marriage at this time.
"But
we're very concerned about 4B because we think it interferes
with the ability of an employer as I said, or a hospital, for
example, to extend benefits that they might want to extend to
same-sex partners. We don't see it as the role of the
legislature to interject itself into that process."
Prof.
Duncan replied that it is clear that this bill would not interject
the government into that process. He also indicated that the simplest
way for same-sex partners to be guaranteed hospital visitation rights
is to have them appoint each other as their proxy for medical decisions
as they can do now.
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