One might think that liberals
as well as conservatives would agree that state registries
of friendships are a bad idea. When it comes to personal
relationships, especially if they involve sex, even
supporters of a regulated economy usually oppose state
intervention. Yet many otherwise privacy-minded citizens
favor opening an official registry of gay and lesbian
friendships, called either "marriages" or
"civil unions," backed by government incentives
to sign up. Are they making a mistake?
Perhaps some supporters of legal recognition
of same-sex unions adhere to what has been called
in jest the German attitude to freedom: "Whatever
is not officially permitted by the State is forbidden."
They may think that homosexuals are not free to form
marriage-like relationships until the government gives
them a certificate of approval. But this is surely
false. Most states have decriminalized non-marital
sexual relations between adults, or never enforce
their prohibitions, so gays there are as free as anyone
else to form long-lasting sexual friendships--and
seal them with promises or vows--without government
approval. Like other forms of friendship and like
heterosexual marriage, permanent same-sex relationships
can exist without state recognition of them. The argument
for legal recognition of same-sex unions is not libertarian.
It is an argument for state involvement in personal
relationships.
It is true that every modern state maintains
a registry of certain heterosexual unions, i.e. of
marriages. Does this mean that heterosexuals have
some liberty that homosexuals lack? Perhaps, but only
in the curious sense that heterosexuals are free to
become less free--and are encouraged by the state
to do so. For the most part, marriage-related legislation
limits, rather than increases, individual freedom:
If heterosexuals try to marry two others at once,
they (unlike similarly situated homosexuals) may be
sanctioned - to take just one obvious duty imposed
by the state. Frankly, marriage law seems at first
more like some hangover from an earlier moral paternalism
than like an instrument of individual freedom--and
is so regarded by many contemporary homosexual as
well as heterosexual thinkers.
Yet it makes no sense to think that
liberal, secular states would aim to restrict freedom
for the sake of an antiquated morality. Moreover,
even if governments were somehow interested in preserving
ancient, quasi-religious customs, why would they always
stop at marriage? Why not officially encourage, certify,
and reinforce other spiritually significant relationship
events, such as the ordination of priests or the monastic
vow of stability? But no modern state does these things.
Why, then, do governments continue to
register heterosexual marriages, if not for the sake
of morals or religion? Everyone knows the answer:
Sexual relationships between women and men may generate
children, beings at once highly vulnerable and essential
for the future of every human community. The good
of those children as well as the common good thus
require that that community do all it can to stabilize
and salinger.such relationships. Lasting marriage receives
public approbation and support primarily because it
helps to produce human beings able to practice ordered
liberty.
Does this singling out of potentially
fertile relationships imply disapprobation of infertile
sorts of friendships? Not at all - no more than the
singling out of binding contracts for legal enforcement
implies disapproval of informal promise-making. The
government is not trying to suppress the kinds of
friendships and promises it does not aid. It just
prefers, rightly, to leave us alone except where protection
of the weak or the common good requires intervention.
The public weal clearly does require
special benefits for heterosexual marriage. Why would
a couple be willing to accept public involvement (and,
to a degree, control) in its most intimate concerns
if it had no strong incentives to do so? Furthermore,
being faithful and raising children necessarily involve
many sacrifices. Since these sacrifices benefit the
whole community in the end, it makes sense for the
community to provide concrete rewards in the form
of special tax, social security, and other legal benefits.
This is especially true where one spouse - usually
the woman, but sometimes the man - gives up much or
all of a career for the sake of raising children.
Such a parent voluntarily shares the vulnerability
of his or her children by becoming a dependent. Justice,
the good of the children, and the common good all
demand that the community provide at least some financial
protection for such self-sacrifice.
It is these benefits, not freedom to
form permanent relationships, which gays and lesbians
obtain through official recognition of their unions.
They get a cut of what really amount to state subsidies,
as well as of the public approval that goes along
with sacrificing for the good of others, in exchange
for increased legal regulation of their property and
liberty. They may be making a mistake as to their
own best interests here. In any event, they certainly
cannot claim a like community interest in their unions,
for they are not, nor do they generate, vulnerable
citizens in need of special protection.
Unless: Are not gay and lesbian unions
also potentially fertile, in that same-sex couples
may jointly adopt children in some communities? Such
an argument is at least on the right track in attempting
to articulate a public interest in such unions. But
it does not really work. Opposite-sex unions might
jointly bear children at any moment, so there is a
public interest in stabilizing them from their very
beginning. Same-sex unions as unions are absolutely
infertile, so there is no possible child-related reason
why a community should care when they are formed or
dissolved. It is true that a community might later
decide to entrust same-sex partners with joint care
and custody of a child, but then this event is the
moment when their union needs to be stabilized. In
other words, adoption by same-sex couples could be
a good reason to recognize those unions, but only
at the time of each adoption - not before.
However, if the argument of this essay
is right - that a liberal regime should not get into
the relationship-certification business except to
protect potential children - why would we permit marriage
to last far beyond child-bearing age and even permit
elderly persons and other infertile heterosexuals
to marry? Letting marriage last a lifetime is easy
to justify. Even adult children often need parental
guidance and security in raising their own kids. Perhaps
most important, a dependent, non-career spouse ought
not be abandoned in an automatic dissolution at a
certain age. As to making new marriages impossible
for the elderly: Excluding those who are too old to
have children from getting married would mean that
men could marry and re-marry at a far more advanced
age than women, something that might have quite disruptive
effects on family life. Perhaps we could screen young
people for infertility before letting them marry.
But such screening would surely be a politically unacceptable
invasion of our privacy.
All that has been said so far amounts
to an argument that there is no strong reason in favor
of official certification of same-sex unions. Those
proposing legal recognition have not met their burden
of proof by showing that fairness or protection of
the vulnerable or nurture of future citizens requires
state intervention. But there are also great harms
generated by such recognition.
First of all, it is unjust to the community
as a whole that the public purse be used to subsidize
couples that do not, as couples, serve the common
good. Those subsidies were set up to encourage and
support unions that are in their nature able to generate
children. It is not right to siphon these benefits
off and pass them on to people to use merely for their
private enjoyment.
Furthermore, to reward some purely private
relationships would be unjust to all remaining unsubsidized
relationships. Why should couples be able to get married
and not groups of three, four or fourteen? And why
limit official unions to those based on sex? A monk's
ties to his monastery might be strengthened by legally
imposed duties. In fact, how could any sorts of friendship
rightly remain unregistrable? (Recall how difficult
it has sometimes been for landlords to exclude any
sort of tenant group without being charged with discrimination.)
David Chambers of the University of
Michigan Law School, in an article favoring same-sex
marriage, has written:
[W]e should respect the.claims made
against the hegemony of the two-person unit.If the
law of marriage can be seen as facilitating the opportunities
of two people to live an emotional life that they
find satisfying - rather than as imposing a view of
proper relationships - the law ought to be able to
achieve the same for units of more than two..By ceasing
to conceive of marriage as a partnership composed
of one person of each sex, the state may become more
receptive to units of three or more.and to units composed
of two people of the same sex but who are bound by
friendship alone.
What would happen if we took
Professor Chambers' advice and offered the same public
benefits to every emotionally satisfying, long-term
relationship? Would the direct and indirect costs
rise so high that they could no longer be paid? I
am thinking not only of economic costs, but also of
the quality of civil society. Do we really want a
State Friendship Registry? Even if the government
used mainly positive incentives, rather than penalties,
to support its scheme, would there not be too great
an intrusion into private life? Would we not have
lost too much freedom and flexibility in our personal
relationships? Would we not have created an excessive
bureaucracy?
Surely the answer is "yes."
Yet every omission from the official list would be
rightly attacked as discriminatory as long as the
purpose of registration were to subsidize private
emotional satisfaction. If the way back to public
support solely for heterosexual marriage were politically
closed, I predict the state would decide just to get
out of the registration business entirely. No relationships
at all would be certified or subsidized. Children
would not be abandoned - professional childcare would
no doubt flourish - but the legal institution of marriage
would disappear.
Richard Stith, J.D. (Yale), Ph.D. (Yale)
Valparaiso University School of Law
651 South College
Valparaiso, IN 46383-6493
Tel. 219-465-7871
Fax: 219-465-7872
richard.stith@valpo.edu
13 August 2002